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PRESERVATION OF BASIS

even though such acquisition would othewise be separate property. 62 A community property agreement 63 may be executed, but care must be taken not to
destroy the status of the joint tenancy property.
DENNIS CALFEE

62. See generally Neeley v. Lockton, 63 Wash. 2d 929, 389 P.2d 909 (1964); In re Brown's
Estate, 29 Wash. 2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947).
63. See WASH. REv. CODE §26.16.120 (1963).

THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF
POSTGRADUATE LEGAL EDUCATION EXPENSES
Educational expenses have never fit comfortably into the framework of
the income tax laws. Theoretically, the costs of learning resemble capital expenditures, personal in nature, made to increase the taxpayer's understanding
and enhance his intellect. Such payments are traditionally nondeductible. On
a more mundane level, expenses are often incurred by an individual for instruction designed to improve the skills employed by him in his trade or business. As a rule, these costs are deductible.' Although the boundary between
these opposing concepts has been difficult to define, it has gradually shifted so
as to enlarge the scope of the latter. Such a shift has been dictated by the growing awareness in the business community of the integral function of education
in increased efficiency and productivity. Likewise, the legal profession has recognized the need for postgraduate legal education programs designed to ensure
the competency of its members. As such programs proliferate and gain acceptance, in some cases as prerequisites to the continued practice of law, the
expenses attendant thereto increasingly take on the flavor of ordinary and
necessary expenses incurred in the practice of law. It is the deductibility of
these expenses that forms the topic of concern in this work.
1.

Section 162, INT. R v.

CODE

OF

1954 allows a deduction for "all the ordinary and

necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business." Educational expenses are not expressly referred to, but the regulations under §162
confirm they are deductible. The deductible educational expenses of a self-employed person
are subtracted from gross income to arrive at adjusted gross income under §62(1) of the

Code. The educational expenses incurred by an employee under a reimbursement arrangement with his employer, such as tuition, books, and fees, are deducted from gross income
to arrive at adjusted gross income under §62(2)(A) of the Code. See TREAs. REG. §1.162-17

for reporting requirements. Deductible educational expenses paid by an employee whose
employer maintains no reimbursement plan are deductible from adjusted gross income as
itemized deductions, unless the employee is in a "travel status." In that case the employee
may deduct his expenses for travel, meals, and lodging while away from home from gross
income to arrive at adjusted gross income under §62(2)(B).
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HISTORY

The allowance of educational expenses as ordinary and necessary trade or
business expenses has evolved in a statutory vacuum. In the absence of specific
legislation dealing with the problem, taxpayers have been forced to rely upon
the courts and the Treasury for guidance. The judicial decisions and administrative regulations and rulings reflect a pattern of increasing liberalization
of the deductibility of educational expenses. In order to aid understanding of
some current problems regarding the deduction, a brief treatment of this
2
evolving pattern is helpful.

Early Developments
Prior to 1950, expenditures for education were generally considered nondeductible, the cost being viewed either as a personal expense or an item to
be capitalized. The Treasury's early position is basically contained in two Office Decisions3 issued in 1921 that reflect a rigid administrative policy disallowing any deduction for educational expenses because they were considered to be
in the nature of personal expenses. This reliance upon the personal aspect of
educational expenses as a ground for denying the deduction was not unique
with the Treasury. The Board of Tax appeals, in two of three reported decisions 4 dealing with the problem, also denied the deduction, deeming the cost
of education to be a personal expense. Disallowance of a deduction for educational expenses by analogizing them to capital expenditures first received tacit
approval from the Supreme Court in Welch v. Helvering.5 This analogy was
adopted by the Tax Court eleven years later and expressly cited as the basis,
6
in part, for disallowing a deduction for educational expenditures.
2. Much of the following historical discussion has been extracted from two sources that
provide excellent treatments of the historical development. See generally Barr, Educational
and Professional Expenses- Section 162, 267 TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO A-7 to A-9; Shaw,
Education as an Ordinary and Necessary Expense in Carrying on a Trade or Business, 19
TAX L. REv. 1 (1963).

3. O.D. 892, 1921-4 CuM. BULL. 209 provided: "The expenses incurred by school teachers
in attending summer school are in the nature of personal expenses incurred in advancing
their education and are not deductible in computing net income." O.D. 984, 1921-5 Cunt.
BULL. 171 stated: "[E]xpenses incurred in taking postgraduate courses are deemed to be in
the nature of personal expenses and are not deductible."
4. T. F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926) (the cost of voice instruction for one who was
anticipating vocal engagements iii a professional capacity held to be nondeductible); Jay N.
Darling, 4 B.T.A. 499 (1926) (expenses incurred by a cartoonist in studying sculpturing for
potential future vocation disallowed as a deduction). The third case, Alexander Silverman,
6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927), allowed the deduction for expenses incurred by a professor in attending a convention for the purpose of keeping informed in his field of work.
5. 290 U.S. 111, 3 U.S.T.C. 111164 (1933). Justice Cardozo made the comparison in dictum,
stating: "Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the goodwill of an old
partnership ....
For many, they are the only tools with which to hew a pathway to success.
The money spent in acquiring them is well and wisely spent. It is not an ordinary expense
of the operation of a business." Id. at 115-16, 3 U.S.T.C. at 3898.
6. James M. Osborne, 3 T.C. 603 (1944) (deduction disallowed for expenses incurred by
an associate professor in writing books for the purpose of increasing his reputation, thereby
making him eligible for higher professional appointments).
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By 1950 the flat prohibition against deducting educational expenses appeared firmly entrenched, regardless of which theory was utilized. In that same
year, however, in Hill v. Commissioner,7 the Fourth Circuit reversed a Tax
Court decision which had held certain educational expenses nondeductible.
Nora Payne Hill, a teacher for 27 years, had deducted certain expenses incurred by her while attending summer school at Columbia University for the
purpose of keeping her teaching certificate in effect. The court, in carving out
an exception for educational expenses incurred by the taxpayer to retain her
existing job, viewed the activity as "a response that a reasonable person would
normally and naturally take under the specific circumstances." s The court
allowed the taxpayer's deduction, noting "she went to Columbia to maintain
her present position, not to attain a new position; to preserve, not to expand
or increase; to carry on, not to commence." 9
The Treasury Department modified its earlier position to accord with the
Hill reversal, noting a limited exception to the general rule of nondeductibility where summer school expenses were "incurred by a teacher for the purpose
of maintaining her position."10 Where the taxpayer failed to come within the
ambit of the exception, however, deduction of educational expenses continued
to be denied.,
In 1953, further inroads were made in the general rule when the Second
Circuit, in Coughlin v. Commissioner, 2 extended the Hill doctrine, significantly broadening the exception. Coughlin involved the deductibility of expenses incurred by an attorney while attending a tax seminar sponsored by
New York University. The court allowed the deduction and reversed the Tax
Court, distinguishing the dictum in Welch" that the cost of education was in
the nature of a capital expenditure. The court noted that the facts were close
7. 181 F.2d 906, 1950-I U.S.T.C. 9310 (4th Cir. 1950), rev'g 13 T.C. 291 (1949).
8. Id. at 908, 1950-1 U.S.T.C. at 12,766.
9. Id. at 909, 1950-1 U.S.T.C. at 12,766.
10. I.T. 4044, 1951-1 CuM. BuLL. 16, 17 modifying O.D. 892, 1921-4 Cum. BULL. 209. The
exception was limited by language to the effect that "expenses incurred for the purpose of
obtaining a teaching position, or qualifying for permanent status, a higher position, an advance in the salary schedule, or to fulfill the general cultural aspirations of the teacher, are
deemed to be personal expenses which are not deductible in determining taxable net income."
Id.; accord, Robert S. Green, 28 T.C. 1154 (1957); William Thompson, 16 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 122,321 (1957); Rhonda Fennell, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. f119,639 (1953).
11. George Coughlin, 203 F.2d 307, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. ff9321 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'g 18 T.C.
528 (1952) (deduction disallowed to attorney for expenses incurred in attending a tax seminar
to keep up with new developments in his practice); Manoel Cardoza, 17 T.C. 3 (1951) (associate professor of history denied deduction for expenses incurred in a voluntary trip to
Europe for study and research); Knut Larsen, 15 T.C. 956 (1950) (industrial engineer denied
deduction for cost of attending night school to obtain a bachelor's degree in administrative
engineering); Samuel W. Marshall, Jr., 14 CiCH Tax Ct. Mem. 121,202 (1955) (cost of music
lessons in preparation for career in music considered a capital expenditure); Richard Lampkin, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 119,019 (1952) (professor denied deduction for a portion of expenses incurred in connection with his doctoral dissertation).
12. 203 F.2d 307, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. 9321 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'g 18 T.C. 528 (1952). See also
Bistline v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 802, 1956-2 U.S.T.C. 110,049 (E.D. Idaho 1956), aff'd
on other grounds, 260 F.2d 80, 1958-2 U.S.T.C. 9619 (9th Cir. 1958).
13. 290 U.S. at 115-16, 3 U.S.T.C. at 3898; see note 5 supra.
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to those in Hill,14 the difference lying in "the degree of necessity which
prompted the incurrence of the expenses." 15 Judge Chase, writing for the
majority, found sufficient necessity to allow the deduction under the Hill
rationale, noting that the taxpayer "was morally bound to keep so informed
• . .to fulfill his professional duty to keep sharp the tools he actually used in

his going trade or business.'16 The "evanescent character"7 of the knowledge
gained by the taxpayer concerning new developments in tax law was held to
deprive it of the permanency generally ascribed in Welch to knowledge that is
obtained primarily as an addition to one's cultural background.
Despite this extension of the Hill exception, the 1954 revision of the Internal Revenue Code failed to include any provision dealing specifically with
the deductibility of educational expenses.18 To fill the gap, the Treasury, in
1956, issued proposed regulations"9 dealing with educational expenses, but
these were never adopted. In 1957, a bill 2° was introduced in Congress that
would have allowed teachers a business deduction for educational expenses
not to exceed $600 per year, but it was never enacted.
The 1958 Regulations
In 1958, the Treasury Finally promulgated and adopted regulations governing the deductibility of educational expenses.2 1 The regulations employed
a primary purpose test with alternative qualifying purposes.2 2- Educational
expenditures were deductible if made primarily for the purpose of "[m]aintaining or improving skills required by the taxpayer in his employment or
other trade or business, ' '23 or for the purpose of "[m]eeting the express requirements of a taxpayer's employer, or the requirements of applicable law or
regulations, imposed as a condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his
salary, status or employment."24 The alternative qualifying purposes were
clearly traceable to Hill and Coughlin. The "meeting the express requirements" test was a restatement of the rationale expressed by the Treasury in
its modification of Office Decision 892 following the Fourth Circuit's reversal
of Hill.25 The "maintaining or improving skills" standard represented Treasury acceptance of the "keep sharp the tools of the trade" rationale propounded
in Coughlin.
The regulations provided that the determination of whether the primary
purpose of education was to maintain or improve the skills required by the
14. 181 F.2d 906, 1950-1 U.S.T.C. 19310 (4th Cir. 1950), rev'g 13 T.C. 291 (1949).
15. 203 F.2d at 309, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. at 47,742.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 310, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. at 47,742.
18.

See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§162.

19. PRoPosan TREAS. REG. §1.162-5, 21 Fed. Reg. 132 (1956).
20. H.R. 4662, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
21. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5 (1958) (now TREAS. RE.. §1.162-5).
22. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(a)(1), (2) (1958) (now TREAS. REG. §1.162-5(a)(1), (2)).
23. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(a)(1) (1958) (now TREAS. REG. §1.162-5(a)(1)).
24. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(a)(2) (1958) (now TREAS. REG. §1.162-5(a)(2)).
25. See note 10 supra.
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taxpayer should be made in relation to that which was "customary for other
26
established members of the taxpayer's trade or business." The regulations
further provided that "[e]xpenditures made by a taxpayer for his education
are not deductible if they are for education undertaken primarily for the
purpose of obtaining a new position or substantial advancement in position,
or primarily for the purpose of fulfilling the general educational aspirations
27
or other personal purposes of the taxpayer." Expenses for education required
of a taxpayer to meet the minimum requirements for qualification in a trade
or business or specialty therein were deemed personal in nature and therefore
28
nondeductible.
The "primary purpose" test under the 1958 regulations, which necessitated
an inquiry into the subjective intent of the taxpayer, resulted in numerous
problems of interpretation. 29 Although the inquiry was normally directed to
30
the time when the taxpayer decided to obtain education, subsequent changes
3
in intent were relevant. - Attempts to determine the primary purpose of the
32
of
taxpayer generated a great deal of litigation and led to the development
3
various judicial approaches, including the "dual purpose" cases.
Other problems included determining the effect to be accorded "custom"
34
of other established members of the taxpayer's trade or business and the disallowance of deductions for expenses incurred by a taxpayer to specialize
within a particular trade or business. 35 Additionally, as a consequence of the
26. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(a) (1958) (now TR.As. RmG. §1.162-5(a)).
27. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(b) (1958) (now TREAs. Rc. §1.162-5(b)(2)).
28. Id.
29. The dissenting opinion of Judge Raum in Clark S. Marlor, 27 T.C. 624, 626 (1956),
rev'd per curiam, 251 F.2d 615, 1958-1 U.S.T.C. 19246 (2d Cir. 1958), espousing what later
became the "dual purpose" doctrine, portended future difficulties for the "primary purpose"
test.
30. Owen Lamb, 46 T.C. 539, 543 (1966), appeal dismissed, 390 F.2d 157, 1968-1 U.S.T.C.
19236 (2d Cir. 1968).
31. Robert Jones, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. g130,229 (1970).
32. Devereaux v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 637, 1961-2 U.S.T.C. 19520 (3d Cir. 1961);
Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. f19789 (N.D. Ohio 1962), aff'd per
curiam, 329 F.2d 145, 1964-1 U.S.T.C. 19318 (6th Cir. 1964); Ronald Weiszmann, 52 T.C.
1106 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 443 F.2d 29, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19312 (9th Cir. 1971); Cosimo A.
Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695 (1962); Donald Frazee, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 126,261 (1963); James
J. Condit, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. f125,716 (1962), aff'd per curiam, 329 F.2d 153, 1964-1
U.S.T.C. 19317 (6th Cir. 1964); Bernd Sandt, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 124,900 (1961), aff'd,
303 F.2d 111, 1962-1 U.S.T.C. 19474 (3d Cir. 1962). See generally Annot., 3 A.L.R.3D 829
(1965).
33. United States v. Michaelsen, 313 F.2d 668, 1963-1 U.S.T.C. 19265 (9th Cir. 1963),
aff'g 203 F. Supp. 830 (1961) and Elmer R. Johnson, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 124,810 (1961);
Devereaux v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 637, 1961-2 U.S.T.C. 19520 (3d Cir. 1961); Maror v.
Commissioner, 251 F.2d 615, 1958-1 U.S.T.C. 19246 (2d Cir. 1958), rev'g per curiam 27 T.C.
624 (1956); Williams v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 351, 1965-1 U.S.T.C. 19263 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). The "dual purpose" cases required a determination of which of the taxpayer's existing
objectives was the more immediate, recognizing that the existence of multiple purposes did
not necessarily mandate disqualification under the regulations.
34. John Martin, Jr., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 127,475 (1965); Donald Frazee, 22 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 126,261 (1963); Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 69, 70.
35. Grant Gilmore, 38 T.C. 765 (1962), and Arnold Namrow, 33 T.C. 419 (1959) (both
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primary purpose test, taxpayers sometimes successfully claimed deductions for
expenses incurred for education qualifying them for other trades or busi-

nesses. 36
As a result of dissatisfaction with the 1958 regulations, the Treasury decided to furnish better guidelines for the deductibility of educational ex37
penditures. Proposed regulations were issued by the Commissioner in 1966.
35
These proved too restrictive and were withdrawn, and a second set of proposed regulations was issued later the same year. 39 These proposed regulations
were subsequently modified and adopted in 1967. 4 0 Although the 1967 regulations effect substantial changes in the 1958 regulations, such as elimination of
the "primary purpose" test, some difficulties of interpretation and application
still exist.
THE

1967

REGULATIONS

An Overview
The 1967 regulations, which remain in effect today, are very similar in
many respects to the 1958 regulations. The 1967 regulations retained the administrative scheme allowing the deduction of educational expenses where
one of two alternative qualifying tests is met. 41 These two qualifying tests are
basically the same as the two alternative tests provided in the 1958 regulations, 42 but whereas under the earlier regulations the focus in applying these
tests had been on the "primary purpose" of the taxpayer in obtaining the
education, the "primary purpose" language was omitted in the 1967 regulations. The present emphasis in applying the two basic tests is placed on the
actual results of obtaining the education. In addition to modifying the application of the alternative tests for deductibility, the 1967 regulations have
imposed a requirement that the educational expenditures which meet the basic
tests must also fall outside certain exceptions.4 3 Although two exceptions are
listed in the regulations, a third has arisen judicially.44

disallowing the deduction for expenses incurred by a psychiatrist for training in psychoanalysis, a new skill); Joseph Booth, III, 35 T.C. 1144 (1961) (deduction for expenses incurred by attorney to become a tax specialist disallowed). But see Greenberg v. Commissioner,
367 F.2d 663, 1966-2 U.S.T.C. 19717 (Ist Cir. 1966), rev'g Ramon Greenberg, 45 T.C. 480

(1966), involving a Tax Court disallowance of a deduction on facts
Gilmore.
36. Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 497, 1962-2 U.S.T.C.
aff'd per curiam, 329 F.2d 145, 1964-1 U.S.T.C. 19318 (6th Cir. 1964);
Tax Ct. Mem. R126,940 (1964); Richard Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
37.

similar to Namrow and
9789 (N.D. Ohio 1962),
Milton Schultz, 23 CCH
126,654 (1964).

T.I.R. 829, 1966-32 INT. REV. BULL. 42.

38. T.I.R. 856, 1966-42 INT. REv. BULL. 82.
39. Id.
40. T.D. 6918, 1967-1 Cura. BULL. 36.
41.

TREAS. REG. §1.162-5(a).

42. TREAs. REG. §1.162-5(a) (1958) (now TREAs. REG. §1.162-5(a)).
43. Id.
44. See text accompanying notes 89-95 infra.
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Basic Tests for Deductibility
Subject to certain exceptions, educational expenditures are deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses if the education either "[m]aintains
or improves skills required by the individual in his employment or other trade
or business" 45 or "[m]eets the express requirements of the individual's employer, or the requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a
condition to the retention by the individual of an established employment
relationship, status or rate of compensation." 46 It is readily apparent that this
language merely echoes that contained in the 1958 regulations. Consequently,
it can be presumed that Treasury acceptance of the Hill and Coughlin
rationales is well established. Noticeably absent is any reference to "primary
purpose." The concern of the 1967 regulations has been directed toward objectively discernible results and away from the ambiguities of subjective intent
or purpose. This deletion was evidently designed to reduce the litigation previ4
ously noted involving questions of taxpayer motive. 7
48
The first alternative test is designed for the taxpayer who voluntarily
continues his education, absent employer compulsion, specifically to maintain
or improve skills required in his employment or other trade or business. This
notion of education that maintains or improves skills "required" in the job
has been loosely interpreted to mean education that is appropriate, helpful or
needed.49 For example, the cost of refresher courses or courses dealing with
current developments in the taxpayer's field is deductible. 5° There must, however, be an identifiable need for the taxpayer to possess the skills which are
sharpened by education.5 ' Some courts have interpreted the "maintains or
improves" language to mean that the taxpayer must be engaged in a trade or
business when he receives the education, previous or prospective employment
being considered irrelevant.5 2 In Thomas W. Gallery,53 for example, the taxpayer was an engineering student employed by Ford Motor Company under
a college cooperative program in which classroom instruction and on-the-job
training were provided in successive trimesters within the same year. The program was designed so that the taxpayer would work one trimester, go to classes
the next trimester, and so on, until completion of the curriculum. The Tax
Court disallowed deductions taken by the taxpayer for educational expenses
incurred by him in attending classes at the college, finding that "petitioner's
45.

TRaAs. REG. §1.162-5(a)(1).

46. TREAs. REG. §1.162-5(a)(2).
47. See cases cited notes 30-36 supra.
48. TREAS. REG. §1.162-5(a)(1).
49. Cosimo A. Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695, 699 (1962); Walter T. Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 126,688 (1964); Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 CuM. BuLL.69, 70.
50. TaRAs. R .§1.162-5(c)(1).
51. R. P. Joyce, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. ff29,858 (1969); Ralph A. Fattore, 22 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 126,264 (1963); Daniel Kates, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. ff25,735 (1962).
52. Thomas W. Gallery, 57 T.C. 257 (1971); Canter v. United States, 354 F.2d 352, 1966-1
U.S.T.C. 19118 (Ct. CI. 1965); Barry Reisine, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. ff30,415 (1970);

D. Cornish, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1129,989 (1970); Rev. RuL 60-97, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 69,
70. See text accompanying notes 86-95 infra.
53. 57 T.C. 257 (1971).
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employment status at Ford was an integral part of his overall education in engineering at the University; he was not engaged in any endeavor other than
being a student."5 4 It is important to note that in Gallery, the court viewed
the taxpayer as never having entered a trade or business. Thus he could not
be engaged in a trade or business at the time he received the education.55 The
situation in which the taxpayer leaves his trade or business to continue his
education raises additional problems which will be dealt with later.56
Additionally, the taxpayer must establish that the education is directly and
proximately related to the skills of his employment.5 In this regard, the cost
of education designed to increase the general understanding and competency
8
of the taxpayer does not qualify as a deductible expense. In James A. Carroll,5
a policeman who undertook a general college program leading to an undergraduate degree in philosophy was not allowed to deduct the cost of such
education. Although the Chicago Police Department encouraged such activities
and cooperated with members of the force taking courses, the court disallowed
the deduction. The Tax Court held that although the education was helpful
and increased the taxpayer's general competency, the proximate and direct
relationship with taxpayer's job skills was lacking.
Under the second test, a deduction is permitted if the education "[m]eets
the express requirements of the individual's employer, or the requirements of
applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition to the retention by the
taxpayer of an established employment relationship, status or rate of compensation." 9 This test refers to education undertaken to meet increased requirements for the position which the taxpayer presently holds and for which
he has previously met the minimum requirements. The deduction is limited
to the minimum education necessary to meet the requirement imposed by the
employer or applicable law or regulations."0 The cost of any additional education is deductible only if it meets the "maintaining or improving" test, subject
54.

Id. at 264.

55. Where the taxpayer has been employed previously, questions can sometimes arise as
to whether the taxpayer retains his status of carrying on a trade or business. A problem
arises, for example, when an employee incurs expenses to change jobs, such as the fee of an
employment agency. Technically, the expenses may not be related to the previous employment because they are expended to secure other employment, and the), appear to be more
in the nature of personal or capital expenses incurred in locating a new business. It has
been held, however, that a taxpayer can be in the trade or business of being an employee,
and the courts rely on this distinction to allow the deduction. Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C.
219 (1972); Kenneth R. Kenfield, 54 T.C. 1197 (1970); Guy R. Motto, 54 T.C. 558 (1970);
David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970). The Service has also accepted the distinction, provided there exists a sufficient relationship between the expenses and the trade or business.
Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-15 INT. REV. BULL. 8.
56. See text accompanying notes 90-95 infra.
57. Burke Bradley, Jr., 54 T.C. 216 (1970); James A. Carroll, 51 T.C. 213 (1968), afl'd,
418 F.2d 91, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 119691 (7th Cir. 1969); I. A. Gross, 31 CGH Tax Ct. Mem.
1131,588 (1972); Alexander Baker, Jr., 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 131,054 (1971). See generally
Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 1 U.S.T.C. 11284 (1928) for a discussion of the
"directly and proximately related" requirement for allowing business deductions.
58.

51 T.C. 213 (1968), afl'd, 418 F.2d 91, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 119691 (7th Cir. 1969).

59. TREAS. REG. §1.162-5(a)(2).
60. TREAS. REG. §1.162-5(c)(2).
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always to the exceptions. It is important to note that there must be a requirement for the taxpayer to obtain the education.61 General encouragement and
cooperation by an employer will not satisfy the requirement. 62 The requirement must be an express one. 63 The regulations further add that the second
test is met only if the increased requirements are imposed for a bona fide
business purpose. 64 For example, a deduction would be allowed for courses
required of flight engineers when their employers converted from piston to
jet planes, since the required education relates to the retention of their status
as flight engineers.6 5
Exceptions
The 1967 regulations impose an additional requirement which must be
met before educational expenses may be the subject of a deduction. Educational expenditures must not be of a type described in any one of three exceptions. Two of the exceptions are provided in the regulations66 and one has
developed through case law. 67 Even though the taxpayer has met one of the
two basic tests for deductibility, his educational expenditures will be denied
deductible treatment if they fall within any of the exceptions.
The first exception deals with expenses incurred by a taxpayer in meeting
the minimum educational requirements for qualification in his employment
or other trade or business. 68 Expenses of education that qualify an individual
for his intended trade or business are deemed so inherently personal and
capital in nature that they are not deductible even though the education
maintains or improves skills required by the individual in his employment or
allows the individual to meet the express requirements of his employer.6 9 The
requirements of the employer, the applicable law or regulations, and the
standards of the particular profession, trade or business determine whether
education undertaken satisfies minimum educational requirements.70 The fact
that an individual is already performing services in an employment status
does not establish that he has met the minimum educational requirements for
qualification in that employment. 7 ' For example, if a taxpayer employed by a
law firm to do legal research is required to obtain his law degree as a condition of continued employment, his law courses constitute education required to
meet the minimum education requirements for qualification in his trade or
61. Daniel Kates, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 925,735 (1962); Louis Aronin, 20 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 2f24,899 (1961).
62. William Kinch, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 2f30,794 (1971).
63. Lawrence H. Bakken, 51 T.C. 603 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 435 F.2d 1306, 1971-1
U.S.T.C. 29188 (9th Cir. 1971).
64. TREAS. RE. §1.162-5(c)(2).
65. See, e.g., Marvin L. Lund, 46 T.C. 321 (1966).
66. TREas. REG. §1.162-5(b)(2), (3).
67. See text accompanying notes 89-95 infra.
68. TRAs. REG. §1.162-5(b)(2)(i).
69. TexAs. REG. §1.162-5(b)(1); see Arthur M. Jungreis, 55 T.C. 581 (1970).
70. TExAS. RE. §1.162-5(b)(2)(i).
71. Id.
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business as an attorney and the expenditures for such courses are not deductible72 A taxpayer need only meet the minimum educational requirements
once; 7 3 education undertaken to satisfy added requirements is education required by the employer or by applicable law and any expenses incurred are
deductible under the second basic test for deductibility. 7
The second category of nondeductible educational expenses includes expenditures by a taxpayer for education which will lead to his qualification for
a new trade or business. 5 The exception precludes a deduction even though
the taxpayer intends to continue as an employee in his existing capacity and
not to engage in the new trade or business.7 1 The thought, once again, is that
expenditures for education that qualify a taxpayer for a new trade or business
are so inherently personal and capital in nature that they are not deductible
even though they maintain or improve skills required by the individual in his
employment or meet the express requirements of the individual's employer.
Qualification for a new trade or business is governed by objective standards
under the 1967 regulations as a result of the deletion of any reference to
"primary purpose." Under the "primary purpose" test of the 1958 regulations,
taxpayers were able to obtain deductions for courses of study that would lead
to qualification for other trades or businesses. The area of deductible law
school expenses is a prime example.7 7 Taxpayers frequently argued successfully
that their primary purpose in attending law school was either to maintain or
improve job skills or to meet express employer requirements.-8 These arguments are no longer available, since the 1967 regulations deny all deductions
where the studies undertaken will lead to qualification for a new trade or
business. In this respect, the "qualification for a new trade or business" exception appears somewhat too restrictive in view of the liberalization generally present throughout the 1967 regulations.-, The exception seems to be
specifically directed toward law school expenses and has the effect of penalizing
individuals who possess law-related skills by denying them deductions for the
72.

TREAs. REG. §1.162-5(b)(2)(iii), ex. 3.

73. TREAs. REa. §1.162-5(b)(2)(i).
74. Id.
75. TREAS. REG. §1.162-5(b)(3)(i).
76. TREAS. REc. §1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), ex. 2.
77. One commentator has noted the unusual results that could occur under the primary
purpose test: "Since 'primary purpose' was determined at the 'time that the taxpayer first
firmly decided to undertake that education' . . . anomalous results could occur. One Revenue
Examiner might be allowed to deduct law school expenses, Milton Schultz, 23 T.C.M. 1372
(1964), while another might not, Robert H. Jones, 29 T.C.M. 866 (1970). Or a claims adjuster might be allowed to deduct law school expenses because his job deals with legal
questions, Richard Baum, 23 T.C.M. 206 (1964), but an NLRB examiner might not, Louis
One taxpayer might be allowed to deduct law school expenses although enterAronin ....
ing the practice of law soon after obtaining his LL.B., Welsh v. U.S., 210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D.
Ohio 1962), aff'd per curiam, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964), while another who continues
" Barr, Educational and Profesbasically the same duties, might not, N. Kent Baker ....
sional Expenses - Section 162, 267 TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO n.435.
78. Williams v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 351, 1965-1 U.S.T.C. 19263 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Walter T. Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mein. 126,688 (1964); Donald P. Frazee, 22 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. f126,261 (1963).
79. For a discusion of this idea, see Barr, supra note 77, at A-18, A-23.
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cost of legal education undertaken by them to maintain or improve their
skills or to meet express employer requirements. 0
In contrast to this apparent restriction, the second exception liberalizes
another concept by using the language "new trade or business." Under the
1958 regulations, a deduction was denied for the expenses of education undertaken by the taxpayer primarily for the purpose of "obtaining a new position"'' or meeting the "minimum requirements for qualification or establishment in his intended trade or business or specialty therein."8 2 The Commissioner and the Tax Court, relying upon the word "position," denied educational expense deductions of taxpayers well established in a trade or business
when a new skill or position was acquired, though the trade or business remained unchanged. 3 The specific reference to "specialty" within a trade or
business in the 1958 regulations was construed by the Commissioner fairly
strictly to limit horizontal mobility within professions. For example, a psychiatrist could not deduct the expenses of acquiring skills in psychoanalysis
because the training qualified him for a new specialty. 8 ' This particular result
was eventually changed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Greenbergv. Commissioner.8 5
The Commissioner has specifically approved in the 1967 regulations the
result reached in Greenberg.8 By omitting any reference to "position" or
"specialty," and by using the term "new trade or business," the Commissioner
has also recognized the deductibility of expenses by the taxpayer for education
to specialize within his existing trade or business.17 The 1967 regulations
further provide that a change of duties, in the case of an employee, does not
constitute a new trade or business if the new duties involve the same general
8
type of work as is involved in the individual's present employment. 8
The third exception has developed by case law and stems from the
language "carrying on any trade or business" in section 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code. It involves the situation in which the taxpayer is neither currently employed nor engaged in a trade or business at the time the expense is
incurred. 9 For example, a student who has never been employed on a full80. Id. It is clear, however, that law school expenses will not be deductible under the
existing regulations where they are incurred to qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or profession, even though the taxpayer possesses law-related skills. Patrick L. O'Donnell, 62 T.C.
781 (1974); Morton S. Taubman, 60 T.C. 814 (1973); Jeffrey L. Weiler, 54 T.C. 398 (1970).
Cf. William D. Glenn, 62 T.C. 270 (1974); Ronald F. Weiszmann, 52 T.C. 1106 (1969), aff'd
per curiam, 443 F.2d 29, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19312 (9th Cir. 1971).
81. Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(b) (1958) (now TREAs. Rec. §1.162-5(b)).
82

Id.

83. Joseph Booth, 1II, 35 T.C. 1144 (1961); Miron Kroyt, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 125,151

(1961).
84. See cases cited note 35 supra. See also Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(3), ex. 2 (1958) (now

T~R. s.
REGc. §1.162-5(b)(3)(ii)).
85.
86.
87.
United
88.
89.

367 F.2d 663, 1966-2 U.S.T.C. 19717 (Ist Cir. 1966), rev'g 45 T.C. 480 (1966).
TREAs. REG. §1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), ex. 4.
Albert C. Ruehmann, III, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1f30,862 (1971). But see Johnson v.
States, 332 F. Supp. 906, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19347 (E.D. La. 1971).
TRaAs. REG. §1.162-5(b)(3)(i).
See cases cited note 52 supra. See also Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511 (1953).
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time basis nor engaged in a trade or business cannot deduct the cost of courses
taken toward a college degree. 0 The application of the exception is less clear,
however, where a taxpayer leaves his employment or other trade or business
to obtain education that meets one of the two basic tests for deductibility. If
the taxpayer completely severs his association with his trade or business for
educational reasons, the availability of the deduction turns on whether the
taxpayer terminated his employment temporarily or indefinitely.
In Furnerv. Comnissioner,91 the taxpayer resigned her teaching position to
attend Northwestern University for the purpose of improving her teaching
skills. She remained at Northwestern for one year and then obtained another
teaching position. The Commissioner and the Tax Court disallowed the taxpayer's deduction for educational expenses, holding she was not engaged in
carrying on a trade or business during the time she attended the university.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that too much
emphasis had been placed on the fact that the taxpayer had not been on leave
from a school system employer while studying during a normal school year.
The court viewed as more significant the broader question whether the relationship of the course of study to intended future performance as a teacher
was such that the expenses thereof could reasonably be considered ordinary
and necessary in carrying on the business of teaching. The court allowed the
deduction, holding that the record would not support a finding that the taxpayer had not reasonably expected to return to teaching after her year of study.
The Service has indicated it will follow Furner where the suspension of
active employment is temporary, that is, one year or less.92 This deliberately
ignores the broader message in Furner- that the determination of what is a
normal incident to the trade or profession should control. The Tax Court has
recognized one year as a "temporary suspension period," 93 however, and
suspension periods substantially in excess of one year will probably not be considered "temporary. " ' 9 4 It is also important to note that merely having professional status is not enough for an individual to be considered as carrying on a
trade or business. 95 Therefore, being a professional during an indefinite suspen90.

Thomas Gallery, 57 T.C. 257 (1971); see text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.

91. 393 F.2d 292, 1968-1 u.s.T.c. 19234 (7th Cir. 1968). The Commissioner and the Tax
Court relied heavily on Canter v. United States, 354 F.2d 352, 1966-1 U.S.T.C. 119118 (Ct. CL.
1965), which supported the idea that leave status is critical to the allowance of a deduction.
Canter was distinguished on its facts by the Seventh Circuit. The taxpayer in that case resigned her nursing position and for the next four years pursued both undergraduate and
graduate studies. The court decided that the record in Canter failed to support a finding
that such an extended absence to pursue further education was a normal incident of carrying on the business of nursing.
92. Rev. Rul. 68-591, 1968-2 CuOM. BULL. 73.
93. John C. Ford, 56 T.C. 1300 (1971) (deduction allowed where taxpayer resigned,
began doctoral studies, and returned to teaching the following year).
94. Don E. Wyatt, 56 T.C. 517 (1971) (deduction disallowed where teacher resigned,
worked as secretary for four years, and then took graduate courses preparatory to resuming
her teaching career); Peter G. Corbett, 55 T.C. 884 (1971) (deduction denied where teacher
resigned, attended school and failed to return).
95. Johnson v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 906, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19347 (E.D. La. 1971);
Henry Owen, 23 T.C. 377 (1954).
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sion of activities does not satisfy the "carrying on a trade or business" requirement for purposes of answering a challenge by the Service under Revenue
Ruling 68-591.
POSTGRADUATE LEGAL EDUCATION

In recent years, many professions have come to recognize the growing
need for continuing education to be made available to their members. The
legal profession is no exception, especially in view of the increasing interest
in specialization.98 Postgraduate legal education programs are basically of two
broad types. Universities and professional associations, such as the American
Bar Association and various state bar associations, frequently sponsor continuing legal education institutes or seminars, primarily for the benefit of
practicing attorneys. This type of program is usually designed to present, in
a period of a few days, new developments within a particular area of the law,
or sometimes to demonstrate important interrelationships between two or
more areas, such as the tax ramifications of divorce and property settlements.
The other type of postgraduate legal education consists of programs of concentrated study in a specialized area of the law, usually for a period of an
academic year and generally leading to an advanced degree, such as the
master of laws. The expenses of attending either type of program can be seen
to have a direct relationship to carrying on the practice of law and, in many
instances, deductibility is well established. 97 Other situations are not so clear. 98
ProfessionalSeminars and Institutes
Mandatory continuing legal education proposals are spreading rapidly and
gaining acceptance in many states as the most promising method of ensuring
professional competence. 9 Although all the plans are designed to compel attorney participation, some contain stricter sanctions than others. Under the
Minnesota plan, for example, failure to fulfill the mandatory requirements
can result in eventual suspension from the practice of law. In contrast, failure
to comply with the terms of Florida's plan results only in loss of the privilege
to hold oneself out as a specialist in an area of the law. It is fairly certain,
however, that all the mandatory plans will compel participation by members
of the bar, though perhaps in varying degrees. As enrollment in continuing
96. See Fla. B. News, July 1975, at 1, col. 3. See also Wolkin, A Better Way To Keep
Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A.J. 574 (1975).
97. Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. 19321 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'g
18 T.C. 528 (1952).
98. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 906, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19347 (E.D. La.
1971). See also Reuben B. Hoover, 35 T.C. 566 (1961), involving a so-called "floating seminar." Questionable attempts to take deductions for expenses incurred to attend seminars on
cruise ships or at resort areas where the purpose of the trip is primarily personal are beyond
the scope of this work.
99. The details of various plans and proposals can be found in issues 19 and 20 of ALI-

ABA CoIMM. ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, CATALOG OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1974-1975).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1975], Art. 6
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA TV REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

legal education programs becomes more widely established as a responsibility
concomitant to the practice of law, the costs incurred in attending such programs will take on added significance as ordinary and necessary expenses of
carrying on a trade or business for income tax purposes. Although continuing
legal education expenses have generally been deductible since the Coughlin
decision in 1953, the emergence of mandatory programs raises interesting new
questions.
The traditional approach to the deductibility of expenses incurred by a
practicing attorney in attending a legal seminar, the substance of which has
been incorporated administratively into the Treasury regulations, originated
with Coughlin. Basically, the Coughlin principle allows an attorney who practices in a particular area of the law to deduct the expenses of attending continuing legal education programs that deal with that area and improve the
skills used by the attorney in his practice. The regulations expressly allow the
deduction where the education "[m]aintains or improves skills required by
the individual in his employment or other trade or business."' 100 Reliance upon
the alternative test - whether the education "meets the express requirements
of the employer" 101 - is infrequent because it generally is not applicable and,
in the majority of cases, is unnecessary, since the "maintains or improves
skills" test is satisfied.
Application of the Coughlin principle is uncomplicated in most instances.
For example, a trial attorney who attends a seminar dealing with newly
adopted rules of evidence has little difficulty in justifying the deduction. On
the other hand, a tax attorney may have some trouble deducting the expenses
he incurs in attending a personal injury litigation program. It might be
argued that the practice of law in general is the measuring stick and that the
costs of attending a continuing legal education program on any subject should
be deductible. The difficulty in supporting this reasoning is revealed by a
closer examination of the facts in Coughlin. The taxpayer there was engaged
in a general practice but had primary responsibility within his firm for handling federal tax problems. He was relied upon by his partners to keep informed about federal tax developments. The court noted that one of the ways
in which the taxpayer discharged this responsibility was by attending the
Fifth Annual Institute on Federal Taxation. In allowing the deduction, the
court stressed that this was an acceptable way for the taxpayer "to keep sharp
the tools he actually used in his going trade or business."' 1 2 Choice of the
words "actually used" seems to preclude application of the Coughlin rationale
to those cases where the attorney attends continuing legal education programs
dealing with subjects of interest to him but of no relevance to his "actual
practice." 0 3
An analysis of the language contained in the regulations seems to support
this interpretation also. The regulations, in the first alternative test, specifically
100.

TREAS.REG.

§1.162-5(a)(1).
§I.162-5(a)(2).

101. TREAS. REc.
102. 203 F.2d at 309, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. at 47,742.
103. See John J. Menas, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 29,609 (1969). But see John C. Ford, 56
T.C. 1300 (1971), aff'd per curiam. 487 F.2d 1025, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. ,9798 (9th Cir. 1973).
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limit the deduction to expenses for education that "maintains or improves
skills required by the individual in his employment or other trade or business." 104 The Commissioner could have used broader language, such as "skills
commonly required in the employment or other trade or business." By specifying "skills required by the individual" in his business, the Commissioner appears to have adopted the Coughlin rationale without attempting to extend
it. This seems to be a reasonable position in view of the policy underlying the
deduction for educational expenditures. Where the education obtained helps
the taxpayer perform his job with greater competence, it has a direct relationship to his business and the expenses incurred should be deductible. Where
the education merely increases the taxpayer's general knowledge and understanding, it lacks the proximate relationship to the taxpayer's job skills and
is more in the nature of a personal expense.
The result is not so clear where the education sought bears only potential
relevance to a taxpayer's trade or business. For example, suppose the tax attorney who attends the personal injury litigation seminar has intentions of
becoming a personal injury trial attorney. The instruction received does not
relate to the taxpayer's existing trade or business, a tax practice, but rather to
a personal injury practice in which the taxpayer is not yet engaged.105 This is
0
r
very similar to the problem raised in such cases as Leonard F. Cremona,1
°
107
Kenneth R. Kenfield, and David J.Primuth." These cases involved situations in which an employee incurred expenses to change jobs. Technically the
expenses did not relate to the existing employment because they were expended to obtain other employment, and they appeared to be more in the
nature of personal or capital expenses incurred to allow the taxpayer to locate
a new business. The Tax Court, however, resolved each of these cases by
holding that the taxpayer was in the business of being an employee or professional person and found employment-seeking expenses to be directly related to this status.
Applying this reasoning to the hypothetical situation appears to provide an
easy solution. The tax attorney has the status, or is in the business, of being
an attorney and all continuing legal education expenses should be deductible.
Such an approach ignores a rather obvious distinction, however, which prevents easy application. Presumably the administrator in Cremona, the engineer
in Kenfield, and the corporate executive in Primuth who sought a new employer expected to receive the same type of position for which they were already qualified. The tax attorney in the hypothetical case, however, will have
an entirely different practice, requiring new and different skills. An attempt
to apply the Cremona-Kenfield-Primuth approach to this particular kind of
104. TREAS. REG. §1.162-5(a)(1).
105. The Service's argument for disallowing the deduction might proceed as follows:
(1) Since taxpayer has a tax practice, the expenses incurred bear no relationship to that
practice and are not ordinary and necessary; (2) Taxpayer's contention that the expenses are
ordinary and necessary because directly related to a personal injury practice is ill-founded,
since taxpayer is not engaged in "carrying on" a personal injury practice.
106. 58 T.C.219 (1972).
107. 54 T.C. 1197 (1970).
108. 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
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problem also appears to violate the Coughlin principle which, as noted before,
seems to focus on the specific skills actually used by the attorney in his practice.
Where the attorney enrolls in courses unrelated to his existing practice, the
introduction of mandatory continuing legal education programs may add a
new dimension to the traditional treatment of continuing legal education expenses. The true mandatory plans, for example, those adopted by the supreme
courts of Iowa and Minnesota in April 1975, pose somewhat different questions
than do the quasi-mandatory designation plans, such as the one adopted by
the Florida supreme court on June 4, 1975.109 A comparison of the two types
of plans serves as a useful frame of reference.
The typical mandatory system is designed to require each licensed attorney within the jurisdiction to complete annually a minimum number of
hours, usually ten to twenty, in continuing legal education courses, but to
leave the practitioner wide choice in the areas studied. A state board or courtappointed commission generally supervises the program and accredits courses
of study. Failure to fulfill the mandatory requirements can result in suspension from the practice of law. Fees are sometimes charged to each attorney for
purposes of funding administration costs, and presumably the expenses of
attending accredited continuing legal education courses is also borne by the
individual attorneys.
Mandatory enrollment in approved courses of study with the attendant
expense raises a new possibility under the income tax law. Traditionally there
has existed little or no compulsion for an attorney to rely upon the second
alternative test of the regulations, which provides a deduction for education
that "[m]eets the express requirements of the individual's employer, or the
requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition to the
retention by the individual of an established employment relationship, status
or rate of compensation."11 0 This standard appears to take on substantially
more significance under the mandatory plans. Where failure to attend the
requisite courses may result in suspension from the practice of law, it can
readily be seen that the continuing legal education offered meets the express
requirements of applicable law imposed as a condition to the retention by the
taxpayer of his established employment relationship or status. Application of
this principle to the hypothetical situations previously discussed illustrates potential variations on the traditional treatment of the deduction.
The trial attorney who attends courses on the rules of evidence is not
really affected any differently. He merely gains an additional argument for the
deduction. As discussed before, he qualifies under the "maintains or improves"
test since the education undertaken relates to the actual professional skills he
employs in his practice. Imposition of mandatory education requirements
under the applicable law or regulations only furnishes this attorney with the
opportunity additionally to assert satisfaction of the "express requirements"
test. A somewhat different result may occur with respect to the attorney who
attends a legal seminar having no relation to his actual practice. For example,
the tax attorney who attends a personal injury litigation program may be able
109.
110.

See note 99 supra.
TREAS. REG. §I.162-5(a)(2).
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to satisfy his state bar's particular professional requirements, since the mandatory programs seem to contain no restriction on the type of continuing legal
education courses which an attorney must attend to keep his license effective.
Although the "maintains or improves" standard is not met because of the lack
of a connection between the course of study and the attorney's practice, the
"express requirements" test provides an alternative for obtaining the deduction. This latter test makes no reference to skills required by the individual;
instead, it provides that the education must only meet express requirements
imposed by law. Therefore, the education can apparently be as broad and
diverse as the attorney desires, subject only to the condition that it satisfy the
mandatory requirements.
This possibility presents an interesting situation since the express provisions of the mandatory plans can determine tax consequences to some extent.
By requiring that attorneys not only attend a minimum number of hours in
continuing legal education courses but also that they attend courses related
to their specific skills, the mandatory plans would preserve the traditional tax
treatment of education expenses in this area. Such a requirement would also
better serve the fundamental design of improving the competence of lawyers.
The specialty designation plan adopted by Florida-' differs considerably
from the pure mandatory scheme. The Florida plan allows attorneys with
three years' experience in a particular field or equivalent postgraduate education to designate such field as a specialty. A maximum of three specialties may
be designated. The right to renew the specialty designation every three years
is conditioned upon the completion by the attorney during each three-year
period of at least 30 hours of approved continuing legal education in each of
the areas in which renewal is sought. Continuing legal education courses offered by the Florida Bar are considered to qualify as approved courses.
It is readily apparent that this type of plan is mandatory only in a very
limited sense. Failure to fulfill the continuing legal education requirements
does not jeopardize the attorney's authorization to engage in the practice of
law or even in the specialty. It merely results in loss of the right to designate
an area of practice or specialty. Consequently, the expenses incurred to participate in continuing legal education courses under the designation plan
might appear to warrant income tax treatment different from that accorded
under the mandatory plans.
As under the mandatory plans, the attorney who attends seminars relating
to the skills he actually uses in his practice has little difficulty in sustaining the
deduction under the "maintains or improves" standard. The "express requirements" test is superfluous in his situation. There is, however, no argument for allowing the deduction to the practitioner who attends programs
having no relevance to his practice, since the designation plan requires continuing legal education in the area of practice designated. The tax attorney
receives no credit under the system for the personal injury litigation seminar
since his designated area can only be tax, 1 2 and he thus fails to undertake any
111.

See In re The Florida Bar,

So. 2d

, No. 46,801 (Fla., June 4, 1975).

112. Section one of the Florida Designation Plan provides that general practice may also
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education which might possibly meet the "express requirements" test. Because
there is no connection between the course and the tax attorney's practice, he
also fails under the "maintains or improves" test.
Problems arise where the attorney who practices in one area intends to
designate another. The hypothetical situation involving the tax attorney who
has aspirations of opening a personal injury practice is a good example.
Initially, in order for the tax attorney to be eligible to designate personal injury litigation'" as his specialty, he must be able to satisfy the threshold requirements. These provide that the attorney must have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least three years with substantial experience in personal
injury litigation during the three years preceding his application for permission to designate, or he must have an equivalent postgraduate degree in a
specialized area." 4 In the usual case, the tax attorney will have engaged in
no personal injury work and will be unable to meet these requirements. As a
result, the specialty designation will not be available to him until too late to
affect the deductibility of his educational expenses. Consequently, the cost of
courses taken by the tax attorney for personal injury litigation instruction is
not deductible. The education meets neither of the alternative tests for deductibility under the regulations.
Once the tax attorney undertakes a personal injury practice, however, any
expenses incurred by him for participation in personal injury litigation
seminars become deductible under the "maintains or improves" test since the
training he receives relates 1o skills he actually uses in his practice. After he
has practiced for three years in that field, the attorney becomes eligible to
apply for permission to designate personal injury litigation as his specialty. At
this point, assuming permission to designate is granted, continuing legal education courses undertaken by him to meet the three-year, thirty-hour requirement in his specialty qualify for the deduction, possibly on two grounds. The
"maintains or improves" test is, of course, satisfied, since the attorney is now
taking courses in his specialty. Additionally, the "express requirements" test
may also be met. That test allows a deduction where the taxpayer incurs expenses for education undertaken to satisfy express requirements imposed by
applicable law or regulations as a condition to the retention of an established
employment relationship or status. Arguably the specialty designation constitutes such a status. A condition to the retention of that status is that the
taxpayer satisfy certain educational requirements imposed by the Integration
Rule of the Florida Bar, which is the applicable law or regulation.

be a designation. The tax attorney might also possibly qualify for this designation, depending
on the extent to which he has narrowed his practice.
113. The proper designation for this specialty as listed in Schedule A of the Florida
Designation Plan is "Negligence, Personal Injury and Wrongful Death."
114. Section 4(c) of the Florida Designation Plan provides a third alternative: "If the
Board finds that a member has had at least three years specialized experience or postgraduate education in an area of practice and that experience or education is not unreasonably remote but that due to extenuating circumstances the member has not had substantial experience in the area during the three years preceding his application, the Board
may waive the requirements of subsection (a) and permit him to designate that area."
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One further point which warrants consideration has to do with the potential assertion by the Service of the "new trade or business' exception.115
This looms as a very real possibility in view of the recognition being accorded
the various specialties under the Florida designation plan. Upon close examination, however, there appears to be very little to substantiate a challenge
based on this exception. Initially, it is important to note that the exception
applies only to education that "qualifies" the taxpayer for a new trade or
business. Ignoring for a moment the question whether a specialty under Florida's plan constitutes a new trade or business, it is evident that education may
never come into play as a qualification requirement under the plan. As discussed previously, the threshold requirement for the initial designation is three
years or more experience in the practice of law with at least three years of
substantial experience in the particular specialty for the period directly preceding the application for designation, or a postgraduate degree in the specialized area equivalent to such experience. Only the alternative postgraduate
degree requirement necessarily involves education in a formal sense. 6 An
attorney will generally qualify for his specialty under the "substantial experience" alternative, without having incurred any expenses for education in that
specialty.-7
Where continuing legal education courses do make up a portion of the
substantial experience of the attorney in a particular area, the expenses incurred generally qualify under the "maintains or improves" test and the exception becomes more important. Even in this situation, however, the Service
will have difficulty in sustaining the exception in view of the language "new
trade or business" in the 1967 regulations. Under the 1958 regulations, the
Service frequently was successful in challenging deductions for educational
expenditures incurred by a taxpayer in entering a specialty. 118 The reason for
such success stemmed from the specific reference to educational expenses incurred to obtain "a new position" or to meet minimum requirements in a
"specialty" contained in the 1958 regulations. The 1967 regulations omitted
this language in the exception and substituted "new trade or business." This
change indicates that shifts "within" a particular trade or business are permissible. Additional support for this proposition can be found in one of the
examples- 9 of the 1967 regulations, which obviously reflects the First Circuit's
decision in G-eenberg. 20 The example allows a psychiatrist to deduct the ex115. TREAs. REG. §1.162-5(b)(3).
116. An extended discussion of the deductibility of expenses for postgraduate degree

education is undertaken in text accompanying notes 121-134 infra.
117. The Service might conceivably challenge the deductibility of expenses incurred by

an attorney to attend continuing legal education programs after he has designated a specialty.
The response to this is that the exception in the regulations applies only to expenses incurred for education to qualify in a "new" trade or business, and that the taxpayer is
merely satisfying the requirements for continued qualification in his existing trade or business.
118. See cases cited note 35 supra.
119. TREAs. Rao. §1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), ex. 4.
120. 367 F.2d 663, 1966-2 U.S.T.C. 119717 (1st Cir. 1966), rev'g 45 T.C. 480 (1966); see

text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1975], Art. 6
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

[
[Vol.
XXVII

penses incurred by him to acquire training in the related field of psychoanalysis. It is expressly declared that such education does not qualify the psychiatrist for a new trade or business. Application of this principle to the legal
profession seems to require that expenses for education to specialize in a
particular area of the law be deductible. This interpretation is consistent with
the overall scheme of liberalization which pervades the 1967 regulations.
PostgraduateDegree Programs
Manifestations of the growing trend in the legal profession toward specialization are not limited to specialty designation programs such as the one
adopted by the Florida Bar. As the scope of the law has broadened and become
more complex, an increasing number of universities and law schools have
added postgraduate legal education programs leading to advanced degrees
such as the LL.M. and S.J.D. in specialized areas of the law. The issue of the
deductibility of expenses incurred by individuals in attending these programs
is a relatively uncharted area, there being only three cases dealing specifically
with the subject.
In Joseph T. Booth,121 expenses incurred by the taxpayer to attend New
York University for purposes of obtaining an LL.M. degree in federal taxation
were held not to be deductible. The taxpayer had received his law degree from
the University of Alabama and been admitted to the Alabama bar. He engaged briefly in the general practice of law and served almost two years as an
assistant legal adviser to the Governor of Alabama. The taxpayer left the latter
position to form a partnership with two other attorneys, and it was mutually
decided that he should attend New York University for training in federal
taxation. The taxpayer had taken no tax courses in law school at the University of Alabama, nor did he ever engage in a tax practice prior to attending
the program at New York University. Following his return from New York
University, the taxpayer was not engaged in the exclusive practice of taxation.
The Tax Court adopted the government's position that the education was
undertaken for the primary purpose of enabling the taxpayer to obtain the
position of partner in a new law firm. Under the 1958 regulations, expenditures primarily for the purpose of acquiring a new skill or specialty or obtaining a new position were not deductible. The Tax Court, relying upon this
principle, stated:
The facts of this case show that petitioner's education in the law of
taxation was undertaken primarily for the purpose of becoming a partner in Wright, Long & Booth which was for him a new position even
though he continued to engage in his same profession, the practice of
law. Under the Commissioner's regulations, on which both parties rely,
the expenses incurred are not deductible.122
Booth would be considered dubious authority today, at least on this narrow
issue, in view of the elimination by the 1967 regulations of the test relied
121.

35 T.C. 1144 (1961).
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upon by the court. The regulations currently provide that educational expenditures are nondeductible where the program of study pursued by the taxpayer leads to qualification in a new trade or business.
Nevertheless, in Johnson v. United States,'123 decided after the adoption of
the 1967 regulations, Booth was cited for the proposition that a year's specialized study of tax law is not ordinary or necessary for most attorneys. Johnson,
like Booth, involved the deductibility of expenses incurred by the taxpayer
while attending New York University in pursuit of his LL.M. degree in taxation. The dispositive issue in Johnson concerned whether the taxpayer was
engaged in a trade or business when he attended the graduate tax program.
The district court concluded that the taxpayer was not carrying on a trade or
business since he had entered the tax program immediately following his admission to the bar and had never actively engaged in the practice of law. Mere
professional status alone was not considered sufficient to constitute the carrying on of a trade or business.
Having judiciously disposed of the determinative issue, Judge Christenberry should have proceeded no further. Unfortunately, he added by way of
dictum:
Expenses for education are deductible if the education is undertaken
primarily for the purpose of maintaining or improving skills required
by the taxpayer in his trade or business, but are not deductible if they
are for education undertaken for the purpose of obtaining a new position or substantial advancement in position or in order to meet the
minimum requirements for qualification in his intended trade or business or specialty therein ....
Here the plaintiff obviously incurred these
expenses to meet the requirements of his intended specialty (tax law)
rather than
merely maintain or improve skills required of an attorney in
1 2 -4
general.

Although the court expressly considered the 1967 regulations as controlling in
the case,1 25 the above-quoted language is obviously taken from the 1958 regulations. As noted before, this language was dropped when the 1967 regulations were adopted and a new standard was substituted.
In Albert C. Ruehmann, 11,126 the ill-founded Johnson dictum was conceded by the government to be an incorrect interpretation of the applicable
law. There the taxpayer, after receiving his LL.B. degree and passing the bar
examination, was employed by a law firm as an attorney for three months before entering an LL.M. program at Harvard. The taxpayer had been employed by the firm as a law clerk before being offered full-time employment
as a lawyer. The firm and the taxpayer had an agreement that the latter could
return as an associate after completing his studies at Harvard and fulfilling
any military obligation he might owe. In pursuing his LL.M. degree the taxpayer enrolled in general business law courses which dealt with the same areas
122.

Id. at 1148.

123. 332 F. Supp. 906, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 9347 (E.D. La. 1971).
124. Id. at 908, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at 86,342.
125. Id. at 907, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at 86,341-42.
126. 30 CCfI Tax Ct. Mem. 130,862 (1971).
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in which he had been engaged while employed as an attorney with his firm. In
its reply brief,127 the Government properly admitted that the court in Johnson
had erred in denying the deduction on the ground that the taxpayer was
pursuing a specialty. The Government noted that such a position would have
been correct under the 1958 regulations but was improper under the applicable 1967 regulations. The Tax Court interpreted this portion of the Government's brief as a concession that the work undertaken by the taxpayer at
Harvard did improve the skills required in the practice of law, that this study
was not required to meet the minimum educational requirements of the legal
profession, and was not education that qualified the taxpayer for a new trade
or business. The Government also conceded that the court should allow the
deduction if it found that the taxpayer was engaged in the trade or business
of practicing law before entering Harvard. The court interpreted this to mean
that if it so found, the taxpayer would be considered to have continued to
engage in that trade or business while attending graduate school. Finally, the
court found the taxpayer had been engaged in a trade or business prior to
entering Harvard because he was a member of the bar and had done the same
work as other inexperienced attorneys employed by the firm.
Johnson and Ruehmann must both be construed as dealing only with the
narrow issue of whether the taxpayer was engaged in carrying on a trade or
business. It is clear, under the correctly decided portion of Johnson, that an
individual who goes directly from law school to an advanced legal education
program may not deduct the costs of obtaining the advanced degree since he
is considered as having never engaged in the trade or business. Conversely,
where the individual engages in the practice of law prior to entering an LL.M.
program, Ruehmann may provide support for the proposition that such individual continues to carry on his trade or business while participating in the
program. It is important to note, however, that the Tax Court in Ruehmann
reached this result through what it considered a concession by the Service. In
the normal situation, the taxpayer may have to run the gauntlet of authorities
such as Furner and Revenue Ruling 68-591 that deal with the issue of what
constitutes a temporary suspension of trade or business activities.128 Where the
taxpayer spends only one year in pursuing graduate work, he satisfies Revenue
Ruling 68-591 and should be allowed to deduct his expenses provided he
meets all other requirements.
Ruehmann also left unclear exactly how much or what type of practice is
required to satisfy the "carrying on a trade or business" requirement. Assume
the taxpayer graduates from law school in Georgia and decides to enter the
LL.M. program at the University of Florida to do graduate tax work. Even
though he has passed the Georgia bar examination, taxpayer's graduate education expenses will not be deductible if he has never practiced law in any
fashion. Suppose, however, that the taxpayer is employed by a firm as a law
clerk immediately following his graduation. Taxpayer continues working as a
clerk until he enters the graduate tax program at the University of Florida,
never having taken a bar examination. It might be suggested that the tax127.
128.

Id. at 679-80.
See text accompanying notes 91-95 supra.
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payer has been engaged in the business of being a law clerk. A more realistic
evaluation leads to the conclusion that the clerking activities are too fleeting
to constitute a trade or business; that the taxpayer's real trade or business is
the practice of law, which he has not entered, since his clerking activities were
probably limited and he was not licensed. What if the taxpayer takes the
Georgia bar examination prior to his employment, engages in substantially
the same work as the firm's attorneys, but is not admitted to the bar until after
he enters the LL.M. program at the University of Florida? A liberal reading of
Ruehmann might lead to the conclusion that the taxpayer has engaged in the
trade or business of practicing law. On the other hand, licensing is a legal
prerequisite to the practice of law in most, if not all, states and the Service
may contend that the taxpayer could not be considered to have actually practiced law until after he has been licensed.
Ruehmann seems to indicate that three months of engaging in the same
kind of work as other attorneys is sufficient for the taxpayer to be considered
engaged in the trade or business of practicing law. If, as proposed above,
licensing is the event which formally signifies an attorney's entry into the profession, then perhaps less than three months of law practice with a license
will suffice. Arguably, the attorney who has practiced one day with a license
has legitimately entered the practice of law. Probably Ruehmann should not
be viewed as a purely quantitative standard. Although the taxpayer in that
case had been accepted into the graduate program before being offered a fulltime position with the law firm, the facts also reflect that both the taxpayer
and the firm contemplated a permanent employment relationship. It was
shown that the firm customarily offered permanent employment to graduating
law students despite the fact that such students planned to spend a year in a
clerkship or LL.M. program. Additionally, the taxpayer was engaged in the
performance of the same activities as other young lawyers in the firm before
entering Harvard. Ruehmann can be more properly construed as authority for
the proposition that all the facts and circumstances determine whether a taxpayer is engaged in carrying on a trade or business rather than merely temporary employment before continuing his education.129
Other problems, not expressly dealt with in Ruehmann or Johnson, regarding the proper application of the 1967 regulations in this area require
answers. It has been previously pointed out that the "maintains or improves"
test may not be satisfied where the taxpayer undertakes unrelated courses of
study, even though he meets the "carrying on a trade or business" requirement.
In Ruehmann, the taxpayer enrolled in advanced legal courses dealing with
the same areas in which he had previously practiced. Since the court did not
rely on this fact as a basis for its decision, the question whether a court would
hold, under the current regulations, that a general practitioner may deduct
the expenses incurred to obtain an LL.M. degree in taxation remains unresolved. Johnson provides no assistance since the taxpayer there had never engaged in the practice of law. Booth is factually on point but deals with the
"obtaining a new position" exception of the 1958 regulations. The proper
129. See Barry Reisine, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. ff30,415 (1970). wherein one year of
practice as an engineer was held not to constitute the carrying on of a trade or business.
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solution is probably arrived at by again strictly applying the rationale expressed in Coughlin and the regulations, which seems to require that there
exist some relationship between the education undertaken and the trade or
business skills which are to be maintained or improved.
Where the "maintains or improves" test is not met, the taxpayer, in some
instances, may be able to rely on the "express requirements" standard. For
example, a taxpayer might be required by his firm to obtain an LL.M. degree
in a specialized area in order to retain his job, status, or salary. The expenses
incurred by the taxpayer, if he is not reimbursed, would appear to be deductible under the "express requirements" test. Of course, the requirement
must be express and must also be one imposed for a bona fide business purpose. Mere encouragement by the law firm will not create an express requirement. Additionally, there must appear to be a legitimate business reason, such
as expansion into a specialized area of the law, for the firm to be considered to
have a bona fide business purpose. The law firm cannot create deductible expenses by requiring advanced education of its employees where there appears
to be no need for the employees to possess such education.
Even if one of the alternative tests for deductibility is met, the taxpayer
must still avoid the disqualifying effect of the exceptions. In certain instances,
the graduate work might simply be necessary to meet the minimum educational requirements of an employer and the deduction would be denied. For
example, consider the situation of an individual who has been admitted to the
bar and engages in the general practice of law for a period of six months with
a firm from which he resigns to enter a graduate program in taxation. After
obtaining his degree, the individual is employed by a tax firm that hires only
attorneys possessing the LL.M. degree in taxation. Obviously, the education
undertaken by the taxpayer was required to meet the minimum requirements
for employment with the tax firm. The requirements of the particular employer are among the factors to be considered under the regulations, along
with the requirements of applicable law or regulations and the standards of
the profession, in determining whether the taxpayer has completed the minimum education necessary to qualify for a position or other trade or business. 130 It appears that the taxpayer may have a difficult time avoiding the
exception, unless he can shift the major focus away from his actual position
to the practice of tax law in general. 13
Because advanced graduate programs in law generally require study in
specialized areas of the law, the taxpayer may also be faced with a potential
Service challenge on the basis of the "new trade or business" exception. This
problem arises, for instance, when an individual who has never engaged in the
practice of tax law enrolls in a graduate tax program. The regulations state
that a change of duties does not constitute a new trade or business if the duties
involve the same general type of work involved in the individual's existing
employment. "[S]ame general type of work,"" 32 however, is illustrated by ex130.

TREAS.

REG. §1.162-5(b)(2)(i).

131. See Arthur M. Jungreis, 55 T.C. 581 (1970), where the Tax Court focused specifically
on a faculty position at the University of Minnesota.
132. TREAS. REG. §1.162-5(b)(3)(i).
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amples relating only to teachers. Exactly how this standard applies to attorneys
is a matter for speculation. Strictly construed, the general practice of law may
not be the same general type of work as a specialized tax practice. On the
other hand, a more liberal interpretation might result in interpreting the
phrase "same general type of work" to mean the practice of law generally.
There is some support in the regulations for this latter view, as has previously
been discussed. The example dealing with the psychiatrist who incurs deductible education expenses to qualify as a psychoanalyst appears to permit
the acquisition of specialties within trades or professions. 133 Omission in the
1967 regulations of any reference to educational expenses incurred to obtain a
"new position" or to qualify for a "specialty," which were nondeductible
under the 1958 regulations, further supports this interpretation. 13 4 Of course,
even if the taxpayer can avoid the "new trade or business" exception, he may
have difficulty satisfying the "maintains or improves" test for deductibility
where he enrolls in an advanced law program dealing with a specialized area
having no relation to his prior law practice.
CONCLUSION

The climate surrounding the deductibility of educational expenses has become increasingly favorable to the taxpayer. The liberalization of such deductions seems appropriate in view of the taxpayer's inability to capitalize
such expenses and take deductions for depreciation. 3 5 There appears to be
no compelling reason to retreat from this trend in the area of postgraduate
legal education expenses. As mandatory continuing legal education programs
proliferate and become an integral part of the practice of law, the expenses
attendant thereto should also be viewed as an ordinary and necessary cost of
being an attorney. Where the taxpayer has legitimately entered the practice
of law, the expenses he incurs in attending continuing legal education programs should be deductible. Likewise, the recognition being accorded specialties in the law by graduate degree programs and specialty designation plans
such as that of Florida does not call for a strict reading of the "new trade or
business" exception under the regulations. Participation by practicing attorneys in these programs helps improve the skills required by them in the
practice of law. In view of the apparent need for strong measures to ensure
competency among members of the legal profession, a strict reading of the
educational regulations would only serve to frustrate sincere efforts to create
better lawyers.
STUART KALB
CHARLES ROBERTS

15.

TREAS. REG. §1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), ex. 4.

134. The Service might appear to have a stronger case for disallowing the deduction

for LL.M. expenses of attorneys in Florida who rely upon that degree to qualify for a
specialty designation. Formal recognition of specialties by the Florida Bar should not add
further support to a Service challenge based on the "new trade or business" exception, since
the regulations are not concerned with specialties, but with new trades or businesses.

135. Nathaniel A. Denman, 40 T.C. 439 (1967).
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